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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC., a 
Utah corporation, ROBERT M. 
WOOLF, individually, DOW 
CORNING CORPORATION, ROBERT 
GOLDWYN, an individual, and 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE 
SURGEONS, 
Petitioners. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS 
AND DR. ROBERT GOLDWYN 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF JUDGMENT OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether this court improperly based its determination 
that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, upon 
plaintiff/appellant's factual contentions which were unsupported 
by (1) citations to the record on appeal; and (2) competent 
evidence and foundational testimony? 
II. whether this court misapprehended the decision of the 
trial court with respect to its factual findings and ruling that 
the motions to quash service of process and to dismiss the ASPRS 
and Dr. Robert Goldwyn were granted for the reason that said 
Case No. 870421 
Case Priority No. 14(b) 
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parties did not have "sufficient contact with the state of Utah or 
plaintiff sufficient to satisfy the minimum contact requirement"? 
III. Whether this court improperly determined that the ASPRS 
and Dr. Goldwyn are subject to assertion of jurisdiction in the 
State of Utah based upon the applicable constitutional guarantees 
of due process? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE 
The statutory provisions and Rule relevant to a determinative 
resolution of this Petition are: (1) Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-24; 
and (2) Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
This Petition for Rehearing arises out of points of law and 
fact which this Court overlooked, and/or misapprehended, the 
substance of which are set forth in detail below. 
Course of Proceedings 
1. On November 15, 1990, this Court entered its Decision, 
vacating the trial court's Order of Dismissal as to both ASPRS and 
Dr. Goldwyn and remanded the matter for trial on the merits. 
Anderson v. Goldwyn, Case No. 870421, at p. 1 (November 15, 1990). 
2. Petitioners file this Petition for Rehearing pursuant to 
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking review and 
rehearing of points of law and fact which petitioners respectfully 
submit that this Court overlooked and/or misapprehended. 
-2-
Statement of the Facts 
1. In its Decision, filed November 15, 1990, this Court 
stated that: 
The next issue is whether defendants' actions with 
respect to Anderson fall within the activities enumerated 
in our long-arm statute. The trial court did not rule 
on this issue; it based its ruling on due process 
considerations only. 
Anderson v. Goldwyn, Case No. 870421, at p. 4 (November 15, 1990). 
2. Contrary to this Court's characterization of the lower 
court's Order of Dismissal, the Record on Appeal, as well as the 
actual Order of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum A, clearly demonstrates that the Court made specific 
factual findings that neither Dr. Goldwyn nor the ASPRS had 
"contacts with the State of Utah sufficient to satisfy the minimum 
contact requirement for assertion of iii personam jurisdiction, 
pursuant to the Utah long-arm statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 
(Supp. 1987))." (Record at p. 1740.) 
3. Despite this Court's characterization of jurisdictional 
facts, plaintiff Anderson failed to reference the Record on Appeal 
to establish any jurisdictional contention or otherwise failed to 
submit any proper foundational testimony to satisfy the burden 
necessary to state a prima facie case of jurisdiction and overcome 
petitioners' uncontroverted jurisdictional affidavits. (See 
Addenda "B" and "C") 
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4. Plaintiff relied upon her own opinion and mere allegation 
in asserting jurisdictional facts. (See generally Appellant's 
Brief and Respondents' Brief at Point I.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court's decision, vacating the trial court's Decision to 
Quash Service of Process and Dismiss Anderson's claims against Dr. 
Goldwyn and the ASPRS for lack of JLn personam jurisdiction is 
improper because it misapprehends the factual determinations and 
decision of the trial court and also misconstrues the nature and 
scope of evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of her 
jurisdictional contentions. 
In addition, the Utah forum has no in personam jurisdiction 
over Dr. Goldwyn and the ASPRS because: 
(1) They have not engaged in any of the activities enumerated 
by the Utah long-arm statute; 
(2) They have not established any meaningful minimum contacts 
or relationships with the State of Utah or Anderson and any 
contacts that may exist between Dr. Goldwyn, the ASPRS, and this 
forum are too random and attenuated to constitutionally support 
assertion of iii personam jurisdiction; and 
(3) They cannot, consistent with constitutional guarantees 
of due process, be forced to defend an action in this jurisdiction 
where plaintiff's asserted jurisdictional facts are based upon mere 
allegation and where defendants have done nothing to purposefully 
avail themselves of the rights and protections of Utah law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THIS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BECAUSE ANDERSON FAILED TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF 
JURISDICTION AND THIS COURT OVERLOOKED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
SPECIFIC FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS. 
Once a jurisdictional determination has been made, this Court 
will presume its correctness: 
we [The Utah Supreme Court] indulge the presumption of 
verity and correctness of the trial court's determination 
and do not disturb it unless the plaintiff has shown that 
it was in error. 
Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corporation, 548 P.2d 1257, at 
1259. See also Cate Rental Co. v. Wahlen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 
1976). 
In order to satisfy plaintiff's evidentiary burden, she must 
have demonstrated, by competent evidence, that not only the 
statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 have been met, 
but also that the quality and nature of petitioners1 activities are 
such that it is reasonable and fair to require them to conduct 
their defense in this State. Mallory Engineering, Inc., v. Brown, 
618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980). Having failed to satisfy this 
evidentiary burden in the trial court, this Court will presume the 
correctness of the lower court's ruling that Utah has no 
jurisdiction over petitioners. 
Despite this presumption, this Court entirely overlooked the 
determination of the trial court that there were no facts to 
support plaintiff's claim that any minimum contacts existed to 
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satisfy the Utah long-arm statute. Instead, this Court erroneously 
concluded that no such finding was made. (Anderson v. Goldwyn, 
Case No. 870421 at p. 4.) 
It is important to note that plaintiff cannot rest on mere 
allegations to establish error in the lower court. In Roskelley 
& Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980), this Court 
declared that: 
We think that a mechanism for determining jurisdiction 
prior to a trial on the merits, analogous to the 
mechanism available for summary judgment, Rule 56(e), 
comports with fairness and due process, and hence that 
allegations in a complaint should not be able to 
withstand the force of specific allegations of fact in 
affidavit form which latter allegations are not 
challenged. In this case, allegations of specific and 
material facts in defendant's affidavit are unanswered 
by plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) 
The Roskelley conclusion that "specific and material facts in 
defendants1 affidavit are unanswered by plaintiff" is fully 
applicable in this case. 
In the instant case, despite references to exhibits and 
affidavits contained in the Record, Anderson makes only occasional 
extrapolated references to the Record to support her factual 
contentions. In many instances, as set forth in detail below, 
there is no reference to any source other than Anderson's own 
opinion or mere allegation. Accordingly, this Court should assume 
-6-
the correctness of the judgment below and may affirm the lower 
court's judgment on this independent basis.x 
In addition, the court in Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western 
Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987), noted 
that the plaintifffs assertions of jurisdiction cannot rest upon 
mere allegation or conclusion; rather, the plaintiff must bear the 
burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Likewise, this Court has previously concluded that a plaintiff's 
jurisdictional contentions may be accepted as true only to the 
extent that they are uncontroverted by the defendants' affidavits, 
are well pled, and are not conclusory. See Roskelley, 610 P.2d at 
1310; and Ten Mile Indus. Park, 810 F.2d at 1524. 
In the instant case, Dr. Goldwyn submitted an Affidavit of 
Jurisdictional Facts, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum B, which remains uncontroverted by plaintiff. Likewise, 
the ASPRS submitted a similar Affidavit of Jurisdictional Facts, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C, which also 
remains uncontroverted. (Record at pp. 1465-67 and 1444-46.) 
According to this Court's analysis, "striking omissions of this 
sort cannot be overlooked or denied their patent importance." 
Roskelley, 610 P.2d at 1310. 
aln State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982), this 
Court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer 
to any portion of the record that factually supports 
his contention on appeal. 
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In contrast, the jurisdictional facts relied upon by plaintiff 
Anderson do not qualify as competent evidence absent foundation 
testimony and otherwise serve to further substantiate the 
jurisdictional facts set forth in petitioners' affidavits. Based 
on this confusion with respect to the lower court's factual 
findings and determinations, and the lack of any evidentiary or 
meaningful Appellate Record support for plaintiff's factual 
contentions, the decision vacating the Order of Dismissal and to 
Quash Service of Process should be subject to rehearing by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
ASSERTION OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS 
WOULD VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS. 
In addition to satisfying the minimum contacts requirements 
of Utah's long-arm statute which, contrary to the Court's decision, 
was specifically decided in petitioners' favor, the constitutional 
requirements of due process must also be satisfied before 
jurisdiction may be asserted over a non-resident defendant. World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); 
Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 247 (Utah 1980). In 
Burt Drilling, this Court stated that: 
[a]fter determining that Section 78-27-24 . . . has been 
satisfied, the remaining question is whether it is 
consistent with our traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice to require defendant to defend this 
action in our courts. (Citations omitted.) 
Burt Drilling, 608 P.2d at 247. 
-8-
In this case, where proper deference is given to the factual 
determination of the lower court and where plaintiff is truly 
required to satisfy the burden of asserting fact beyond mere 
allegation, the issue of due process need not be reached because 
the minimum contacts requirement is not satisfied. 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court stated that 
certain factors may be considered to determine whether the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction fails to comport with "fair play 
and substantial justice.11 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). The factors listed by the Court 
included, among others: a defendants purposeful activity in the 
forum, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the 
burdens on the defendant, and the shared interests of the several 
states in furthering fundamental, substantive social policy. See 
also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), and 
Worldwide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. 
A. ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn Did Not Engage In Purposeful 
Activities In Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court stresses "fair warning" and 
"foreseeability" as important factors in evaluating "minimum 
contacts" and determining "fair play and substantial justice." 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citations 
omitted). 
The Supreme Court of this State has also consistently held 
that in order for a nonresident defendant to become subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts, there must have been some 
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intentional and purposeful activity of such defendant in the State 
of Utah by which he takes advantage of the benefit and protection 
of its laws, and is further obliged reciprocally to submit to its 
remedies. In Hanks v. Administrator of Estate of Jensen, 531 P.2d 
363 (Utah 1974), while acknowledging that the Utah long-arm statute 
is applied to the fullest extent permitted by the due process 
clause, this Court clarified that: 
It is nonetheless true that our courts cannot take 
jurisdiction over a resident of another state simply for 
the convenience or desire of the plaintiff. The 
rationale of statutes and the decisional law in the trend 
toward extending jurisdiction over foreign residents is 
that there must be some intentional and purposeful 
activity of the defendant in the forum state by which he 
takes advantage of the benefits and protections of its 
laws, and is obliged reciprocally to submit to its 
remedies. (Emphasis added.) 
Hanks v. Administrator of the Estate of Jensen, 531 P.2d 363 (Utah 
1974) at 364. 
In the instant action, there is no purposefully established 
relationship between the petitioners and this forum. * It is 
important to note the jurisdictional facts listed by this Court at 
page 6 of its Decision are directly controverted by the unanswered 
affidavits of Dr. Goldwyn and the ASPRS. Under these 
circumstances, plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction, absent some reliable evidentiary submission. Indeed, 
petitioners do not engage in any continuous or systematic activity 
in Utah. In fact, their contacts with Utah, if any, are so 
sporadic and so minimal, that it is in no way reasonable for them 
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to anticipate being brought to court here. (Record at 1444-46 and 
1466-67.) 
B. ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn Could Not Reasonably Anticipate 
Being Haled Into Court In Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that ,f[t]he due 
process clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not 
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he 
has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties or relations.'" 
International Shoe Col, v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319. See also 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). The United 
States Supreme Court also stated that "the foreseeability that is 
critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's 
conduct in connection with the form state [is] such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.11 Worldwide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
The only conceivable relationship between the ASPRS and the 
State of Utah arises from the fact that out of approximately 2600 
active members of the Society, 30 members reside in this State. 
(Record at 1445 and Schedler Affidavit at f 7.) The controversy 
in this case does not stem from any activities relating to ASPRS 
membership. The presence of in-state membership in an out-of-
state organization is not a sufficient basis upon which to base an 
assertion of jurisdiction over the organization. Szabo v. Medical 
Information Bureau, 127 Cal. App. 3d 51, 179 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1981); 
Elizabeth Hospital, Inc., v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. 
Ark. 1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 
-11-
884 (1959). Indeed, to hold otherwise would be tantamount to 
finding jurisdiction over a foreign corporation merely because it 
has shareholders who reside here. Case authority clearly forbids 
such a holding. See e.gY Oostdyk v. British Airtours, Ltd., 424 
F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
Dr. Goldwyn's only relationship with the State of Utah is an 
attenuated monitoring function and limited correspondence with Dr. 
Woolf arising out of either Anderson or her physician's unilateral 
acts. Exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under these circumstances 
cannot comport with due process. Such attenuated contacts with 
Utah have been consistently held insufficient for assertion of in 
personam jurisdiction. See Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 
548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976); and Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co., 549 
P.2d 707 (Utah 1976) . 
In summary, Dr. Goldwyn and the ASPRS have not purposefully 
engaged in any activity or conduct in this State and do not have 
sufficient contacts with the State of Utah to reasonably anticipate 
being haled into a Utah court under the Utah long-arm statute or 
applicable Utah law. 
CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for petitioners hereby certify that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioners submit that the 
Decision rendered by this Court, vacating the trial court's Order 
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of Dismissal as to both Dr. Goldwyn and the ASPRS, should be 
subject to rehearing before this Court, pursuant to Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
r\\oVt J. (W^Tlims 
""Larry R. LaFycock 
Attorneys for Defendants American 
Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons and Dr. 
Robert Goldwyn 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC., a 
Utah corporation, ROBERT M. WOOLF, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. C-83-7367 
individually, DOW CORNING _ . _ , „ _ 
CORPORATION', ROBERT GOLDWYN, Jud^e L e o n a r c H- R u s s o n 
an indivual, and THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC 
AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS, 
Defendants. 
Defendants American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons ("ASPRS") and Dr. Robert M. Goldwyn1s Motions to Quash 
Service of Process and for Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint in 
the above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on September 25, 1987 in a special 
setting at the hour of 9:00 a.m.; Elliott J. Williams and 
A-l 
Larry R. Laycock of Snow, Christensen & Martineau appeared 
on behalf of defendants ASPRS and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D. 
and Dan Bertch appeared on behalf of plaintiff Celia Anderson, 
and the court having heard oral argument, reviewed the pleadings 
and memoranda filed herein, and being fully apprised in the 
premises hereby finds: 
1. Defendant Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D., did not have 
contacts with the State of Utah or plaintiff sufficient to 
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement for assertion of 
in personam jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute 
(Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1987)). 
2. To assert jln personam jurisdiction over Dr. Goldwyn 
under the circumstances of this case would constitute a 
violation of constitutional due process. 
3. Dr. Goldwyn1s motion for dismissal and to quash 
service of process should be granted on all of the grounds 
listed in the memoranda submitted by Dr. Goldwyn. 
4. Defendant ASPRS did not have contacts with the 
State of Utah or plaintiff sufficient to satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement for assertion of jln personam jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 
(Supp. 1987)). 
5. To assert jln personam jurisdiction over ASPRS under 
the circumstances of this case would constitute a violation 
of constitutional due process. 
A-2 
0 0 ^ -
6. ASPRS' motion for dismissal and to quash service 
of process should be granted on all of the grounds cited in 
the memorada submitted by ASPRS. 
7. The court finds that there is no just reason for 
delay and entry of judgment should be expressly directed 
as provided in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND GOOD CAUSE 
APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants ASPRS and Dr. Robert M. Goldwyn's motions 
for dismissal and to quash service of process be and the same 
are hereby granted and the plaintifffs claims against said 
defendants are dismissed and service of process upon them is 
quashed for the reason the courts of the State of Utah lack 
personal jurisdiction over them. 
2. There is no just reason for delay and entry of 
this Order as a final judgment is hereby expressly directed 
pursuant to Rule 54 (b) ,AJta.Yi Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this / /day of October, 1987. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE Or UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SKAUNA JENSEN, being duly sworn, says that she is emplcyed 
in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Marrineau, attorneys 
*n~ Defendants ASPPS and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D. u~*.~ • ~, 
-or -* herein, tr*c: 
she served the attached Order of Dismissal (unsigned) 
(Case Nc.) 083-7367
 u - c n t h e 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in 
envelope addressed to: 
Dan Bertch, Esq. 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 501 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
P. Keith Nelson, Esq. 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Ray R. Christensen, Esq. 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 7th day of October , 1987 • 
SKAUNA JENSEN" • , 
SUBSCRI3ED AND SWORN to before me this 7th <jay 
of October , 1937. 
NOT. 
Mv Ccmr.issior. Excires: 
iOTARY PU^lIC yj 
I l^lqf 001
! 
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
LARRY R. LAYCOCK (A4868) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Robert Goldwyn and American 
Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floo 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC., a 
Utah corporation, ROBERT M. 
WOOLF, individually, DOW 
CORNING CORPORATION, ROBERT 
GOLDWYN, an individual, and 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE 
SURGEONS, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
DR. ROBERT M. GOLDWYN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states the following upon his own personal 
knowledge and information: 
y^crvsi' iriUi ^ j 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. 
GOLDWYN, M.D. 
Case No. C 83-7367 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
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I am a resident of Brookline, Massachusetts, and am over 21 
years of age. 
2. I am a medical doctor specializing in plastic and 
reconstructive surgery and am licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Massachusetts. I am in private medical practice 
in Brookline, Massachusetts. 
3. Although I am a member of the American Society of 
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("Society"), I am not 
employed as a medical doctor for the Society. I have never 
performed any medical service or treatment whatsoever on behalf 
of the Society in Utah or anywhere else. 
4. I am not an agent, employee or representative of Dow 
Corning Corporation. I have never performed any medical 
treatment or service for Dow Corning Corporation in Utah or 
anywhere else. 
5. I am not presently and never have been licensed to 
practice medicine in Utah. I have never advertised, maintained 
an office or otherwise transacted any business in the State of 
Utah. Further, I do not own, use or possess any real property 
situated in Utah. 
6. I was appointed medical monitor for the MDX4-4011 
Silicone Injection Study by agreement with the Federal Drug 
Administration and the Society for the purpose of screening 
potential patients for the said Silicone Injection Study. 
B-2 
001 
Medical information for Celia Anderson was forwarded to 
Massachusetts from her physician for the purpose of obtaining 
my approval for Celia Anderson's voluntary entry into the 
Silicone Injection Study. Based on the information I received 
from Celia Anderson's physician, I approved her entry into the 
Silicone Injection Study. 
7. My role in Celia Anderson's entry in the Silicone 
Injection Study was limited to review of medical information 
provided by her physician. That review was conducted in 
Massachusetts. I have never seen or communicated with Celia 
Anderson. 
DATED this day of July, 1987. 
Dr. Robert Goldwyn 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of July, 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:__ 
My Commission Expires: 
SCMLRL54 
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STATE OF ILLINOIS ) 
) SS.: 
COUNTY OF COOK ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS R. SCHEDLER 
Thomas R. Schedler, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states: 
1. I am the Executive Director of the American Society of 
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("ASPRS"). 
2. ASPRS was founded in 1931, and is incorporated under 
the not-for-profit corporation laws of the State of Illinois. 
ASPRS has its headquarters and principal place of business in 
Chicago, Illinois. ASPRS is exempt from federal income taxation 
under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
3. ASPRS has no office or employee in the State of Utah. 
ASPRS is not qualified to do business in the State of Utah, has 
not designated an agent for acceptance of service of process in 
Utah, has not contracted to supply services or goods in Utah, and 
has no telephone listing or bank account in Utah. ASPRS does not 
own, use or possess any real estate in Utah. 
4. ASPRS does not practice medicine or manufacture, sell 
or distribute MDX 4-4011 or any drug or device in Utah or any 
state, and did not draft, prepare or distribute the consent form 
in issue. 
5. ASPRS is a voluntary association comprising 
approximately 2,600 active members, who are practicing plastic 
surgeons in the United States and Canada. 
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6. The ASPRS membership meets once a year. The ASPRS 
annual meeting is held in various cities. The ASPRS annual 
meeting has never been held in the State of Utah. 
7. Approximately 30 active ASPRS members reside in the 
State of Utah. 
8. As part of my duties as ASPRS Executive Director, I 
attend meetings of various medical societies, public interest 
groups or government agencies throughout the United States. I 
have never represented ASPRS at a function in the State of Utah. 
For at least the past ten years, ASPRS has never been represented 
at a function in the State of Utah. 
9. For at least the past ten years, ASPRS has conducted no 
educational symposia or seminars in the State of Utah. 
10. ASPRS does not license, certify or accredit physicians 
or hospitals. Membership in ASPRS is not a prerequisite to the 
practice of medicine or surgery in any state. 
11. ASPRS does not solicit applications for membership, but 
accepts applications from qualified physicians who are sponsored 
for membership by two ASPRS active members. 
12. Applications for membership in ASPRS are submitted to 
the ASPRS office in Chicago, Illinois. When the membership file 
in Chicago is complete, including letters of reference and other 
supporting information, the application is reviewed in Chicago by 
the ASPRS Membership Committee. Favorable recommendations by the 
Membership Committee are presented to the ASPRS Board of 
Directors. If an application is approved by the Board, the 
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applicant's name is submitted to the assembled membership at the 
ASPRS annual meeting, and a favorable vote of 80% of those 
present and voting is required to admit an applicant to 
membership in ASPRS. 
13. All membership dues are billed from and paid to the 
ASPRS office in Chicago, Illinois. In 1986, estimated total dues 
collected from all ASPRS members was $1,300,000. Estimated dues 
collected during 1986 from active members residing in Utah were 
$14,500. 
14. ASPRS is governed by a 21-member Board of Directors. 
No directors reside in Utah. 
15. My personal domicile and residence are in the State of 
Illinois. 
Further Affiant saith not. 
Thomas R< Schedler 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this T& day 
of > W 1987 
Notary Public 
My Commission expires frAv«W? ^ , ^%°\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the 29th day of November, 1990, 
I cause four (4) true and correct copies of the Petition for 
Rehearing of Petitioners American Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons and Dr. Robert Goldwyn to be served upon 
the following: 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
Attorneys for Appellant 
4001 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
P. Keith Nelson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorneys for Broadbent & Woolf and Dr. Woolf 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Ray R. Christensen 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
Attorneys for Dow Corning Corporation 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
